Friday, February 25, 2011 - 3:51 PM
Watching the international response to Libya, it's notable that the Western powers appear to be firmly in the driver's seat. American and European leaders are almost frenetically issuing statements, drafting resolutions, and convening multilateral meetings. The European Union wants tough multilateral sanctions. So does Washington! Meanwhile, the United States and Europe are congratulating themselves over a new UN Human Rights Council resolution, Joe Biden's talking about how countries forfeit their sovereignty when they commit abuses, and NATO's convening an emergency meeting.
Indeed, for all the talk of international power shifts and rising BRIC diplomatic and strategic power, the superficial public dynamic appears to be very similar to that in the early 1990s, when the Western powers pushed through the United Nations an interventionist agenda, largely on human rights grounds, in places including Cambodia, Somalia, northern Iraq, and the Balkans. At the time, Russia, China and other big players largely stood aside, swallowing their disquiet about what they often saw as unwise intrusions in countries' domestic affairs.
The world is very different now of course. The economic wind is in the emerging countries' sails. By all accounts, China is more outspoken, competent and confident in international fora than it was in the early 1990s. Brazil and India are feeling their oats and jostling--sometimes almost demanding--new global leadership positions. Russia has long since abandoned the doormat status it assumed briefly in the early 1990s, when it was utterly dependent on Western aid and indulgence. Meanwhile, the advanced economies are in recession, slashing their budgets, and deeply uncertain about their futures. NATO's in the midst of a draining and controversial Afghan mission that has all but exhausted the patience of many alliance members.
So why then is the West so loud on Libya while the emerging countries maintain a low profile? Part of the answer may be that the West's slippage in relative power hasn't yet worked its way into its foreign policy DNA. The Western powers still feel interventionist even if the economic and strategic foundations of that interventionism have eroded. What's more, the West feels comfortable working the levers of international institutions like the Security Council in a way that Moscow, Beijing, Delhi and Brasília still don't. When a crisis hits, the American and European instinct is to set the various parts of the global governance machinery in motion. They may not produce much of value, but at least they make a lot of noise.
The other answer is that the disparity in volume reflects key substantive differences. The emerging powers are quiet not because they don't have the assuredness to speak out but because they believe that silence is the appropriate international response to most domestic matters. One key question will be whether these more soveignty-minded states at some point soon feel moved to restrain the interventionist impulses that are running so strong in Washington and Brussels.
But there's an even more fundamental question: after years of reading and vaguely going along with Western-authored Security Council resolutions and other multilateral missives condemning various abuses committed by sovereign governments against their own people, have these states (and Moscow and Beijing, in particular) started to absorb that interventionist, scolding mindset? For the moment, power is flowing from the West to the emerging economies. Are norms and values going along for the ride? Libya may help to answer that question.
Update: There are some superb comments from readers, including this:
The fact that emerging powers 'emerge' doesn't mean they would carry themselves the same way the current established powers do. Perhaps because of their shifting status, of their perceived experiences of dependence or colonisation (affecting their understanding of sovereignty as you mention), one certainly should not measure their level of diplomatic 'activity' by the loudness of their spokespersons. It's a different approach.
I agree that volume isn't necessarily the best metric; the question is whether there's much going on behind the scenes.
For the record, it is São Paulo, with 'u'. But in any case, the capital of Brazil is Brasília.
They might have simply decided that Qaddafi is simply too embarrassing to defend, that he isn't worth defending against such a concerted effort by the West or that his chances of survival are so slim that they aren't going to risk defending him.
Additionally I'm still of the opinion that talk of BRIC as a unified organization is really more hype than fact.
I think David Bosco is right to mention that the "West feels comfortable working the levers of international institutions like the Security Council in a way that Moscow, Beijing, Delhi and Brasília still don't." But there are some missing pieces here. Given the alliance structures of western powers and other aspects of great power global politics, the pressure is on for SOMEONE to do SOMETHING -- and entities both in the Middle East and elsewhere look to western powers to act. They are there; everyone knows they have the resources to act; and based on the values articulated in Europe and US there is some basis to expect some action. Tell the truth: no one expects the BRIC countries to do anything -- no matter that they all have substantive relations with Libya and interests there worth defending. And given the extraordinary complexities and unknowns involved, I suspect BRIC country leaders are quite ambivalent about getting involved -- even behind the scenes.
In more recent news, the so-called BRIC states might not have wanted to openly attack Libya but they did unanimously vote in the Security Council to put sanctions on the country. Perhaps Qaddafi really doesn't have any useful allies left.
The world is run by America. We are all in an American global empire.
America is ideologically driven, but amoral. However you choose to describe America's ideology- democratic capitalism, liberal democracy, capitalist, it is amoral and driven by interests.
America claimed that it intervened in Somalia for humanitarian interests. But almost no media or expert or analyst mentioned that Siad Barre had awarded American companies all the mineral rights for Somalia just before being toppled. And Somalia not only has oil, its said to have enormous amounts of minerals, including coal, and even uranium.
And America did not SAVE Bosnian Muslims. America prolonged the conflict in order for attrition of the power of all of them, including that Bosnian Muslims would succumb. It was well known that America and NATO enforced sanctions and embargoes on the Bosnian Muslim enclaves so they were unable to arm or supply or gain foreign support from anyone. And the result was several more years of conflict and Bosnian liberation was reduced to a triumvirate under foreign occupation.
BTW, Brazil was a military dictatorship backed by America for decades. America supported oppression and bloody authoritarian rule in many countries.
All powerful nations, particularly their leaders, wish to be influential abroad for a variety of reasons. This interventionist and hegemonic impulse goes into overdrive when coupled with a missionizing secular or religious ideology. American Exceptionalism, Napoleonic France imperialism, Orthodox and Soviet Russia, Islamic empire, and periods of Chinese imperial expansionism are all good examples. For these ideologies to succeed, of course, there must be a perception or reality of economic or institutional dividends. People tend to forget about how much of this is institutional, but the article addresses this when discussing foreign policy makers.
I would argue that at present, although this may change, realpolitik is what drives Chinese and Russian foreign policy, not timidity. There isn't an ideology that impells them to intervene and, because of political and cultural differences, there isn't the interventionist alliance, for lack of a better term, we see between US government bureaucracies, private industry, and ngos.
Europe can be divided into three camps. The US' Eastern European allies are clients and will follow their patron. Britian is pretty simple, residual Protestant Imperialist Paternalism combined with Cultural Marxism tells them that they or someone "must" do something. Western Europe is a tougher one to understand. There are real economic interests at stake, but combined with this is a decidedly internationalist impulse on the part of the leadership which can't be explained away by NATO membership.
American exceptionalism divorced from economic realities would be a nonentity. But how much of a threat Libya presents to the US economy is debatable, the US is already in dire straits. But that doesn't matter to government and private parties looking to protect their bureaucratic turf and budgets and venal defense industries.
American involvement in Libya, as American involvement anywhere, will be due to a continuned alliance of institutions, private and governmental, and industries that stand to profit by an intervention. Not too profound, pretty simple.
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