Friday, May 27, 2011 - 3:56 PM
There's plenty of reason to hope that Gaddafi's reign is finally coming to an end. More ministers have defected. Rebel forces appear to be gaining strength. Even Moscow is now acknowledging that Gaddafi must go. But Max Boot is worried. In particular, he's concerned that NATO hasn't done enough planning for a post-Gaddafi Libya and that policymakers might be forgetting how substantial a stabilization force will need to be:
If the aim is to replicate the Bosnia/Kosovo experience then 330,000 peacekeepers would be called for. If Iraq is the model, 94,000 peacekeepers would be needed. [snip]
Of course, as with all such metrics, these are very rough rules of thumb that need to be adjusted based on circumstances. In Libya there are a number of factors that suggest lesser levels of risk, including the fact that the eastern portion of the country around Benghazi has been relatively peaceful and stable under rebel control. So perhaps even 94,000 peacekeepers won’t be needed. But it is likely that a need substantial if smaller force will still be required, and it is imperative for NATO policymakers to begin planning for such a deployment. As part of that planning process, they need to shine greater public attention on this issue and make clear why a peacekeeping force would need to be sent. Otherwise they risk shock and opposition among publics that have not been prepared for yet another deployment.
The time to begin the process is now—not when Qaddafi is finally toppled. A stabilization force must be ready to go any time, so as to avoid losing valuable time when the day does come.
Boot is right to be worried. I don't have the sense that Western governments are close to being ready to dispatch a stabilization force--or that they've even really grapped with whether to do so. If Gaddafi falls tomorrow, there would likely be a significant period without any significant international presence. If Libya is very lucky, the transition to a post-Gaddafi era may be peaceful. Bt there doesn't seem to be any reason to bet on that.
Of course, a stabilization force need not be mostly Western. Richard Gowan has suggested a largely BRICS force, which might have a more neutral profile. And Russia has recently voiced support for a peaceekeping force, though it has not specified what form it might take. A traditional UN peacekeeping force is an option, though probably not as attractive as when it appeared that Libya was headed toward semi-permanent partition. A blue-helmeted peacekeeping force would actually make less sense in a post-Gaddfi Libya than in one divided between Gaddafi and rebel forces. UN peacekeepers work best when there is a stable ceasefire line; more robust forces will probably be necessary if there is a weak transitional government attempting to run the entire country.
Hi David,
Thanks for the link. A few responses:
* I agree that Max Boot is right to warn that governments aren't thinking seriously enough about a peacekeeping force in Libya. One reason is that, as you imply in your last paragraph, a lot of members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition associate a peacekeeping force with partioning Libya. This is erroneous. Peacekeepers can also be deployed in unified but unstable post-conflict countries to (i) keep order; (ii) deter spoilers; and (iii) secure elections, etc. So even if Gaddafi falls and Libya is unified, you may need an outside force to create stability and manage a transition to democracy.
* I did muse about the BRICs sending military observers to Libya in a scenario in which (i) Gaddafi fell relatively quickly; and (ii) the post-conflict situation was uneasy but not too bad. If, as you suggest a larger force is needed and also has to deploy rapidly, the BRICs aren't natural force suppliers. In this higher-risk scenario, likelier options might be a Turkish or Arab multinational force that could deploy fast by sea and land into Libya. This is an option that I've discussed in an essay for the UAE's "The National":
http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/muslim-peacekeeping-in-libya-brothers-in-arms
* As I argue in the National piece, Turkish and Arab leaders might balk at a completely independent deployment - they'd probably want the cover of a UN resolution, and quite possibly a fully UN-commanded, blue helmet operation. I tend to disagree with your assessment that the UN couldn't run a large, pretty rapid deployment. As Bruce Jones, Jake Sherman and I pointed out in a piece over on FP's Middle East Channe a couple of months ago (when we all thought that this ruddy war would be over rather quicker) the UN has experience of just this sort of deployment in Lebanon in 2006:
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/11/can_the_un_clean_up_libya
Still, whoever gets this deployment can look forward to a potentially very rough ride - so it's not surprising that a lot of governments and organizations are wary of the subject. Thanks for underlining its importance!
Richard
My biggest question I came across with America's role with Libya was what I heard on CSPAN from if I got this right the former ambassador to Russia saying that we neither had formal or informal diplomatic talks with rebel government/groups in Libya. I understand that we may feel burnt with dealing with revolutionary Islamic groups with how that's gone with us in the past, but it doesn't really bode well for post Gaddafi world when dealing with Libya from an American perspective.
I wonder if Congress will balk at the lower cost of paying for a U.N mission then they would for a more expensive bombing campaign.
Peacekeeping force is not like other than scouts.
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